Accreditation and the Construction Industry : Five Approaches to Countervailing Employer Power by Rose, Joseph B.
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 












Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 11 février 2017 01:33
Accréditation and the Construction Industry: 
Five Approaches to Countervailing 
Employer Power 
Joseph B. Rose 
In this paper, the authar aims at describing the various 
législative approaches to accréditation which hâve been adopted 
and at evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of différent 
efforts to reduce employer fragmentation and redress the im-
balance of power within the industry. 
Inquiries into the nature of labour-management relations in construc-
tion hâve pointed out the need for « countervailing employer power » 
within the industry's collective bargaining framework.1 Accréditation 
législation has been advanced as one means of achieving a better balance 
of power between labour and management in the organized sectors of 
the industry. Essentially, accréditation can be defined as the granting of 
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1
 See Report of the Royal Commission on Labour-Management Relations in 
the Construction Industry, H. Cari GOLDENBERG, Commissioner, Ontario, 1962 ; 
H.W. ARTHURS and John H.G. CRISPO, « Countervailing Employer Power : Ac-
créditation of Contractor Associations, » in Construction Labour Relations, eds. H. 
Cari GOLDENBERG and John H.G. CRISPO, Ottawa, Canadian Construction Asso-
ciation, 1968 ; and Report of the Commission of Enquiry Into Industrial Relations 
in the Nova Scotia Construction Industry, H.D. WOODS, Commissioner, Halifax, 
Department of Labour, 1970. 
exclusive bargaimng nghts to an 
employers' organization for a parti-
cular trade or trades in a specified 
sector of the industry within a desi-
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gnated géographie area. Through accréditation, employers' organizations 
would be better able to exercise direction and control of their members 
and thus reduce intraorganizational strains or fragmentation, particularly 
during crucial phases of negotiations. 
The advocates of such législation believe that it can equalize bar-
gaining power in the industry and thus help to stabilize labour-manage-
ment relations.2 Spiraling wage settlements and labour unrest hâve 
prompted criticism of single-trade bargaining patterns and the ability of 
unions to employ divide-and-conquer tacties, e.g., whipsawing and leap-
frogging, which hâve had an unsettling effect on collective bargaining. 
Once an employers' organization is aceredited, individual employers 
covered by an accréditation order are prohibited from negotiating a sepa-
rate agreement with a trade union or council of trade unions. Resort to 
individual bargaining by contractors has been a traditional structural 
weakness which has hampered the bargaining strength and effectiveness 
of employer associations. Furthermore, backers of accréditation feel that 
such législation could in the future alter the bargaining structure in 
constrution by fadlitating the growth and development of multi-trade 
and multi^party bargaining. An assessment of the impact of accréditation 
on bargaining patterns is presented below. 
The purpose of the présent study is twofold. The first is to describe 
the various législative approaches to accréditation which hâve been adop-
ted ; the second is to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of différent 
efforts to reduce employer fragmentation and redress the imbalance of 
power within the industry. 
ACCREDITATION AND LABOUR LEGISLATION 
Accréditation has been adopted in five provinces : Ontario, New 
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Alberta and British Columbia.3 At the présent 
time there is also draft législation on accréditation before the Prince 
Edward Island Législature. Manitoba and Saskatchewan hâve recently 
amended thier labour codes, but hâve not made provisions for accredita-
2
 ARTHURS and CRISPO, op. cit., p. 377. 
3
 Québec, on the other hand, has adopted more extrême législation which 
spécifies bargaining représentatives for the industry and contains a decree System 
(the juridical extension of a collective agreement to the entire industry within a 
specified area). 
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tion. In Newfoundland, no décision has been made regarding changes in 
the légal framework and in the fédéral jurisdiction, Bill C-183, which 
governs the construction industry in the Yukon and Northwest Territories, 
does not extend légal récognition to the current structure of construction 
collective bargaining. 4 
The various accredition schemes can be broadly classified as 
« realistic » of « conservative », depending on the form which the bar-
gaining unit takes. Under the realistic model, « the bargaining unit could 
include ail unionized contractors organized by a given union in a particular 
trade, sector and géographie area, but without regard to their member-
ship in the association. » 5 The conservative model includes contractors 
who belong to an existing employer association which already has a 
collective bargaining relationship with a union in a particular trade, sector 
and géographie area. The realistic model has been adopted in ail provinces 
except British Columbia. 
ONTARIO AND NEW BRUNSWICK 
New Brunswick's accréditation scheme was modelled on the approach 
contained in the Ontario Labour Relations Act. Essentially, there are no 
substantive différences in the two Systems. However, as will be noted 
below, there has been an important amendment to the New Brunswick 
Act which may hâve a significant impact on construction collective bar-
gaining. The analysis of accréditation schemes will focus on four areas : 
(1) détermination of an appropriate unit ; (2) the légal effect of accréd-
itation ; (3) termination of accréditation orders ; and (4) other issues. 
Appropriateness of Unit 
In order for an employers' organization to be accredited, the Ontario 
Labour Relations Board must rule on the appropriateness of the geo-
4
 Canadian Consturction Association, Submission to the Minister of Labour 
Regarding Bill C-253 — An Act to Amend the Canada Labour Code, 1971, pp. 
18-20. Under this scheme, contractors would be permitted to withdraw from the 
accredited group at any time, hardly a practice consistent with promoting greater 
employer unity. The whole question of accréditation is being reviewed by the 
Canada Department of Labour. 
5
 ARTHURS and CRISPO, op. cit., p. 403. 
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graphie area and sector6 contained in the application. The Board need not 
restrict itself to a single géographie area or sector but rather can combine 
areas or sectors or parts thereof where advisable.7 Additionally, an 
appropriate unit must encompass ail unionized employers in the designated 
géographie area and sector.8 The scope of accréditation orders, i.e., 
whether they are granted on a single-trade or multi-trade basis, dépends 
on whether the employers' organization has bargaining rights with a single 
trade union or a council of trade unions. 9 
To be accredited, a double-majority is required. In other words, an 
employers' organization must represent a majority of the employers in 
the appropriate unit and thèse employers must in turn employ a majority 
of the employées in the unit.10 The double-majority principle is designed 
to strike a balance between small and large contractors by providing a 
safeguard against accrediting an employers' organization dominated by 
many small firms employing a minority of employées on the one hand 
and one dominated by a few large firms employing a substantial number 
of employées on the other. 
6
 Sector is defined as a division of the construction industry as determined 
by work characteristics. Thèse include the industrial, commercial and institutional 
sector, the residential sector, the heavy sewers, tunnels and watermains sector, the 
roads sector, the heavy engineering sector, the pipeline sector, and the electrical 
power sector. Ontario Labour Relations Act (1971), Section 106(e). In New 
Brunswick, sector is similarly defined except there is no electrical power sector. 
7 Section 114 (1). By defining sector in the Act, the Board does not hâve as 
much latitude in determining the appropriate unit as it does in certification cases. 
Moreover, some bargaining patterns eut accross sectors, complicating further the 
détermination of an appropriate unit. 
8
 Section 114 (2). The employers' organization must also be properly cons-
tituted and free of union interférence. Sections 115 (3) and 115 (5). 
9 Section 113 states that 
« . . . an employers' organization may apply to the Board to be accre-
dited as the bargaining agent for ail employers in a particular sector 
of the industry and in the géographie area described in the said cer-
tificates, voluntary récognition documents or collective agreements, 
as the case may be. » 
10
 Sections 115 (2) (a)-(b). Majority support is determined on the basis of 
empolyers who employed employées within the past twelve months. However, an 
accréditation order covers employers in the appropriate unit who hâve a collective 
bargaining relationship with a trade union or council of trade unions regardless of 
whether they employed employées in the prior year. Board sponsored élections are 
not contemplated in Ontario or New Brunswick, although in Nova Scotia votes 
can be taken to accredit an employers' organization, and in Alberta votes can be 
taken to de-accredit an employers' organization. 
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Légal Effects 
There are several légal effects of accréditation. First, existing collec-
tive agreements between an individual employer and a trade union remain 
in effect until the termination date at which point the collective agreement 
concluded by the accredited employers' organization becomes binding. 
This applies irrespective of whether the présent agreement contains pro-
visions for renewal of the contract. In addition, where a union establishes 
bargaining rights for employées of employers in the accredited unit, thèse 
employers are bound by the agreement concluded by the accredited em-
ployers' organization.n Finally, a collective agreement between an 
accredited employer organization and a trade union is binding upon the 
accredited employers' organization, the trade union, each employer and 
the employées in the bargaining unit.12 
Terminating Accréditation 
Three aspects regarding the termination of an accréditation order 
should be noted. First, where a collective agreement has not been con-
cluded, an application will be considered timely during the two months 
following the one year period after an accréditation order was granted. 
Where a collective agreement is in force, applications will be aceepted 
during the last two months of the contract's opération.13 A second re-
quirement for de-accreditation is the need to demonstrate double-majority 
support. Upon a Board déclaration that the employers' organization no 
longer represents the employers in the unit, any collective agreement 
between the parties ceases to be operative. Therefore ail rights, duties 
and obligations previously assumed by the accredited employers' orga-
nization must be assumed by individual contractors and the trade union 
may serve a notice to bargain for the purpose of concluding a collective 
agreement.14 
Other Issues 
There are several other features of the Act regulating the behavior 
of an accredited employers' organization. It establishes a duty of fair 
n Sections 116(2)-(4). 
12 Sections 117(2)-(3). 
13 Sections 118(l)-(2). New Brunswick's de-accreditation system is somewhat 
différent from Ontario's. It spécifies différent timeliness criteria and applications 
to cancel an accréditation order can be filed by a trade union. New Brunswick In-
dustrie Relations Act (1972), Sections 50(l)-(2) and 50(5)-(6). 
14
 Ontario Labour Relations Act, Sections 118(4) and 118(6). 
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représentation ;15 it prohibits discrimination in denying or terminating 
membership ;16 and it bans the charging of unreasonable or descrimi-
natory fées.17 Perhaps most important, however, is that the Act bans 
individual bargaining altogether. In addition to prohibiting bargaining by 
individual employers and deeming any collective agreements entered 
into by thèse employers void, there is also a ban on any agreements or 
understandings that would provide « for the supply of employées during 
a légal strike or lock-out... » 18 However, both Ontario and New Bruns-
wick hâve a « saving » clause. 
Nothing in this Act prohibits an employer, représentée by an accredited 
employers' organization, from continuing or attempting to continue 
his opérations during a strike or lock-out involving employées of em-
ployers represented by the accredited employers' organization. 19 
This « saving » clause seems to contradict the intent of the prohi-
bition on individual bargaining, since it would enable a contracter to 
operate during a strike or lockout. If an accredited employers' organiza-
tion cannot exercise direction and control over the contractors it bargains 
for, especially over issues such as strikes and lockouts, then how can it 
hope to minimize employer fragmentation ? This « saving » clause is an 
open invitation to contractors to abandon their associations and thereby 
weaken the very essence of the accréditation system, which is to unify 
employers in collective bargaining. The ability of individual employers 
to abandon their associations will only exacerbate the vulnerability of 
employer associations to the « unions' traditional divide and conquer 
tactics. » 20 
Spécial Feature 
In New Brunswick, the accréditation scheme largely parallels that 
of Ontario. However, with the passage of Bill 41, an amendment to the 
15 Section 120. 
16 Section 121. 
17 Section 122. 
18 Section 119(2). 
19
 Section 119(3). The question might be raised as to whether the bylaws 
of an employers' association could prohibit individual employers from operating 
during a work stoppage. It must be remembered that an accredited employers' 
organization is composed of both association members and non-members and that 
such bylaws would not be binding on non-members. 
20
 John CRISPO, « Ontario's Bill 167 : Reform of the Status Quo, » Relations 
Industrielles, XXVI, January, 1972, p. 861. 
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Industrial Relations Act, a bold new experiment in industrial relations was 
launched. This amendment created the Lorneville Area Projects Bar-
gaining Authority (LAPBA), which shall be responsible for the conduet 
of industrial relations in the Lorneville area.21 The LAPBA is unique in 
that it consists not only of employers and employer associations, but also 
includes owners. In a sensé, the Lorneville area has been insulated from 
the effects of accréditation in order to experiment with tripartite bar-
gaining. It is a widely held belief that if Lorneville construction bargaining 
is successful, the concept will be applied throughout the province. The 
next year may reval what the future of accréditation will be in New 
Brunswick. 
Assessment 
There are three apparent weaknesses in the Ontario and New Bruns-
wick accréditation Systems. First, neither of thèse schemes gœs far enough 
in promoting greater employer unity, largely because of the « saving » 
clause. Second, national-international contractors are not covered under 
this législation. In the past, such contractors hâve signed free-ride agree-
ments in exchange for labour peace. Thèse agreements hâve had two 
négative effects : they hâve seriously undercut the bargaining position of 
local contracter associations and enabled striking workers to secure alter-
native work opportunities. The third problem is that accréditation is tied 
to existing bargaining rights. Since most bargaining takes place on a local 
single-trade basis, accréditation is unlikely to alter bargaining structure 
significantly. It should be noted that by permitting trade accréditation 
instead of sector accréditation (as in Nova Scotia) the danger exists of 
« consolidating and perpetuating the présent trade (as distinct from ré-
gional) fragmentation. » 22 
21
 The Lorneville area is the site of the Saint John Deep Project and the 
New Brunswick Power Commission's thermal generating station. The project is 
expected to last 12 to 15 years and the value of construction is expected to reach 
$1 billion by 1985. Letter from James Maskell, Development Manager for the 
New Brunswick Development Corporation, July 31, 1972. 
22
 Letter from G. H. Durocher, Director of Labour Relations, Canadian 
Construction Association, January 3, 1973. Mr. Durocher has noted an important 
weakness in the way the Ontario législation deals with existing agreements once 
an accréditation order is issued : 
« This is more important in the early years of experimenting with 
accréditation. Several establishments in Ontario hâve already managed 
to escape the accréditation net for up to 8 years by extending or enter-
ing into free-ride agreements while the législation was still in the mill 
or before an accréditation order was issued. > 
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ALBERTA 
The Alberta Labour Act (1970) and its amendment (Bill 79 passed 
in 1972) contain provisions for accréditation or, as it is referred to in 
the Act, registration of an employers' organization. The Act varies in a 
number of ways from Ontario and New Brunswick. 
Appropriateness of Unit 
There are essentially three différences in determining the appropriate 
unit in Alberta. First, the employers' organization need only represent a 
majority of the employers in the unit. 23 Second, the Alberta Industrial 
Relations Board must rule on the appropriateness of the trade jurisdietion 
and area applied for. 24 Unlike other provinces, sector is not defined in 
the Act and thus the Board has wider discrétion in determining the 
appropriate unit. Finally, registered employers' organizations hâve exclu-
sive authority to bargain on behalf of national-international contractors 
who employ employées in the area and trade jurisdietion. 25 
Légal Effects 
In Alberta, a collective agreement between an employer and a trade 
union terminâtes when a collective agreement between an employés' orga-
nization and a trade union or council of trade unions is concluded or 
cornes into force, whichever occurs later, or when notice is given of a 
lockout or a strike. 2€ In addition, where a collective agreement has not 
been concluded by the registered employers' organization and a notice 
to bargain has been given to an employer covered by the registration 
order, the employers' organization shall bargain on his behalf. If a collec-
tive agreement is concluded, it remains in effect until a collective agree-
ment between the registered employers' organization and the trade union 
is concluded or notice of a strike or lockout is given. 27 
Terminating Registration 
Two aspects of de-registration are particularly noteworthy. The 
Board will consider applications where « a strike or lockout has been in 
23 The Alberta Labour Act (1970), Section 7 5 ( 2 ) ( b ) . 
24 Section 75(2) (c ) - (d) 
25 Section 75(4) (a) (iii). 
26 Section 75(5.1) . 
27 Section 75(5.3) . 
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effect for a period of 60 days. » 28 This provision suggests that a registered 
employers' organization could hâve a very short « insulated » period in 
which its exclusive bargaining status is secure. It could also weaken the 
registration system since individual contractors could commence bar-
gaining after 60 days. Where de-registration takes place, any collective 
agreement concluded by a registered employers' organization continues 
to be binding on every employer, trade union and employée.29 This 
contrasts with other « realistic » models where such collective agreements 
cease to operate. 
Other Provisions 
The ban on individual bargaining is subject to one limitation. 
Where a strike or lockout is in effect, no parties to the dispute, other 
than the registered employers' organization and the trade union or 
trade union members of a trades council, shall for a period of 60 
days from the date the strike or lockout commenced conclude any 
collective agreement or enter into any form of settlement and any 
such other agreement or settlement is void and of no effect.30 
Thus after 60 days a contractor is free to enter a collective agreement and 
such agreement will remain in effect until or unless the registered em-
ployers' organization successfully concludes a collective agreement.31 
Such a provision could endanger the existence of a registered group if a 
substantial number of individual collective agreements or other types of 
settlement were reached. However, in two respects Alberta's législation 
promotes greater employer unity : ( 1 ) there is no « saving » clause, and 
(2) sélective strikes are banned and employers represented by a registered 
employers' organization must participate in a lockout supported by a 
majority of the employers.32 
Another unique provision of the Act allows a registered employers' 
organization to assign bargaining rigths to another employer group.33 
This stipulation could encourage more centralized bargaining patterns. 
The Alberta Construction Labour Relations Association hopes to even-
tually assume bargaining rights for registered employers' organizations in 
the province. 
28 Section 76(1) . 
29 Section 76(4) (b ) . 
30 Section 75(6) . 
31 Section 75(7). 
32 Section 98(8) - (9 ) . 
33 Section 75.1. 
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NOVA SCOTIA 
In October, 1972, Nova Scotia became the fifth province to adopt 
an accréditation System. While similar to other « realistic » mode] s, three 
areas are worth contrasting : the appropriateness of the bargaining unit, 
cancellation of accréditation, and the promotion of employer unity. 
Appropriate Unit 
One immédiate contrast is the définition of sector which includes : 
« industrial and commercial ; homebuilding ; sewers, tunnels and water 
mains ; roadbuilding ; or any other sectors determined by the Panel. » 34 
Such a définition would give the Panel35 greater flexibility in determining 
appropriate units than is the case in Ontario and New Brunswick, particu-
larly where bargaining cuts across sectors. To be accredited the employers' 
organization must either represent a rnajority of the unionized contractes 
in the unit or not less than 35 percent of the unionized employer:? in the 
unit who in turn employ a rnajority of the employées in the designated 
géographie area and sector.36 Although not as stringent as the double-
majority prineiple, this plan does attempt to strike a balance between 
small and large contractors. 
Perhaps the most outstanting aspect of Nova Scotia's législation is 
that it promûtes multi-trade, multi-party bargaining by providing for 
accréditation by « sector » rather than by « trade ». This is so because 
an employers' organization need not restrict itself to existing bargaining 
relationships when applying for accréditation. Instead the employers' 
organization need only be conceraed with the sector and géographie area 
it wishes to bargain for. Presumably an accréditation order would cover 
ail unionized employers within a sector, e.g., 15 to 19 trades in industrial 
and commercial construction. Therefore the Panel is likely to influence 
bargaining patterns, i.e., promote more centralized and multi-trade bar-
gaining, to a greater degree than in other « realistic » models. 
34 Nova Scotia Trade Union Act (1972), Section 89(h). 
35
 The Construction Industry Panel of the Labour Relations Board. This 
Panel has greater authority than construction industry divisions of the Boards in 
Ontario and New Brunswick. For example, Section 91(6) states : 
« Any act of the Panel shall be conclusively deemed to be the act of 
the Board in relation to the jurisdiction, power and authority vested In 
and exercisable by the Panel or in relation to duties or functions per-
formed by the Panel . . .» 
36 Section 94(3). 
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Terminating Accréditation 
The Panel will consider an application where no collective agreement 
has been concluded one year after an accréditation order, or between the 
forty-sixth and forty-ninth months following an accréditation order, or 
« during the three month period immediately preceeding the end of every 
third year thereafter. » 37 The latter two stipulations provide an employers' 
organization with a greater period of security by substituting fixed time 
intervais for contract expiration dates in determining the timeliness of 
applications. Double majority support is required to cancel an accrédita-
tion order.38 
Employer Unity 
Nova Scotia's législation goes further in promoting employer unity. 
The reason is twofold. First, there is no « saving » clause wihch would 
permit employers to continue opérations during a légal strike or lockout. 
Furthermore, employers can engage in individual bargaining only after 
accréditation is terminated. Unlike Alberta, individual bargaining is not 
permitted after a 60-day strike or lockout. 
BRITISH COLUMBIA 
In April 1970, British Columbia became the fîrst province to adopt 
a system of accréditation.39 The prevailing characteristic of this accrédita-
tion system is that it is restricted to members of the applicant association 
and therefore does not bind non-members. Characterized as a voluntary 
system, the accredited employers' organization is the exclusive bargaining 
agent « of those members of the organization who consent to the applica-
tion. » 4° This approach is in marked contrast to other accréditation 
schemes. Indeed, under this approach the Board's primary responsibility 
is to détermine if the employer group is a proper organization for collec-
tive bargaining and if the employers belong to and hâve given authority 
to the applicant. 41 
37 Section 98(1). 
38 Section 98(3). 
39 Accréditation in British Columbia is not solely restricted to the construction 
industry. 
40
 Winnipeg Builders Exchange, Brief to the Manitoba Government, 1970, 
p. 11 (mimeographed). 
41
 This approach is simplified by the fact that there are only two accredited 
employers' organizations in the construction industry. The B.C. Road Builders As-
sociation and the Construction Labour Relations Association represent contractors 
in road building construction and ail other phases of construction, respectively. 
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An employer, named in the accréditation, may, during the fourth and 
fifth months immediately following the executing of a collective agreement 
entered into by the employers' organization on his own behalf, appîy to 
the Board to withdraw from the accréditation. 42 Such a provision would 
appear to do little to unify employer représentation and stabilize labour-
management relations. However, in actual practice this has not been a 
problem because the Board has imposed stringent criteria for withdrawal, 
e.g., a change in the nature of the business or going out of business. The 
critical weakness of this scheme is the inability of the accredited employers' 
organization to control non-members. 
IMPACT OF ACCREDITATION 
Any attempt to measure the impact of accréditation on collective 
bargaining in the construction industry is subject to two limitations : the 
newness of the législation and the difficulty of accurately measuring such 
concepts as stability in labour-management relations. However, a prelimi-
nary assessment of its impact in Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia 43 
suggest that accréditation has enhanced employer unity, although its im-
pact on bargaining parity and stabilizing labour-management relations is 
less clear. Through September, 1972, 16 employers' organizations hâve 
been accredited. u Three aspects of accréditation will be examinée : ( 1 ) 
employer unity ; (2) impact on bargaining structure ; and (3) stability 
in labour relations. 45 
Employer Unity 
In gênerai, it appears that accréditation has helped to reduce em-
ployer fragmentation in collective bargaining. 46 For example, in British 
Columbia the Construction Labour Relations Association (CLRA) 47 
42
 British Columbia Labour Relations Act, Section 9A(6). 
43
 Accréditation législation in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia was adopted 
in 1972 and therefore is too récent to analyze. In New Brunswick, several cases 
involving the Saint John Construction Association are awaiting décision. 
44
 Seven each in Ontario and Alberta, and two in British Columbia. 
45
 For a review of labour board expérience with accréditation, see Joseph B. 
ROSE, Report on Accréditation and the Construction Industry, Fredericton, New 
Brunswick Department of Labour, 1972. 
4 6
 This section of the paper is based on interviews with employer représen-
tatives and government officiais in Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia. 
47
 CLRA is a multi-trade, province-wide organization which bargains for 
approximately 850 employers employing between 30,000 and 50,000 workers. 
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has remained united despite two lockouts lasting more than three months. 
CLRA has also been aided by « [c]o-operation from the Employers' 
Council in ensuring that construction users did not put pressure on con-
tractors to break ranks in order that their pet project could be completed » 48. 
In Alberta, ACLRA has enjoyed some success in coordinating bargaining 
activities and is presently seeking coopération from construction users. 
However, concern over weaknesses in the législative framework, e.g., the 
« saving » clause and the exclusion of non-association members from 
accréditation in British Columbia, hâve been expressed. 
Another issue has been the move to establish non-union companies 
by contractors covered under accréditation. This latter development points 
out that législation can only help contractors who are willing to help them-
selves. In other words, accréditation can only help employers to effectively 
organize, if they so choose. However, non-union compétition need not 
undercut the strength of accredited employers' organizations. It can be 
argued that the development of non-union firms, provided they do not 
offer employment to unionized strikers, will enhance the bargaining po-
sition of accredited employers' organizations 49. 
Bargaining Structure 
Accréditation has had only a limited impact on bargaining structure. 
While bringing some individual employers who normally bargain indepen-
dently within the employers' organization, there has not been a central-
ization of the géographie scope of negotiations or a growth of multi-trade 
bargaining. However, two récent developments are noteworthy. The récent 
amendment to Alberta's législation permitting the transfer of registration 
may resuit in more centralized bargaining. In addition, the récent request 
by six trade unions for multi-trade bargaining with CLRA in British Co-
lumbia may set the stage for future negotiations. Furthermore, it will be 
interesting to observe the effect of sector accréditation on the structure 
of bargaining in Nova Scotia. 
48 Donald A. S. LANSKAIL, Président of the Pulp and Paper Industrial Rela-
tions Bureau, Address to 53rd Annual Convention of the ^Canadian Construction 
Association, Toronto, Ontario, January 25, 1971, p. 13 (mimeographed). 
49
 Letter from G. H. Durocher, op. cit. The « non-association unionized firm », 
on the other hand, has posed problems for CLRA in British Columbia. 
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Stability in Construction 
Any attempt to assess the broader issue of whether accréditation has 
stabilized 50 labour relations in construction would be prématuré. Looking 
to British Columbia, where bargaining under accréditation began in 1970, 
success in reducing wage inflation has been reported. Wage settlements 
were running close to 20 percent annually in 1969, whereas estimâtes of 
récent settlements (including fringes) show a décline : 10.8 percent in 
1970 ; 9.2 percent in 1971 ; and 7.7 percent in 1972 51. However, thèse 
results were achieved against a backdrop of two prolonged work stoppages. 
While some hâve decried such lengthy disputes, others hâve suggested that 
it is better to face a common expiration date for ail trades and the possi-
bility of a single work stoppage, even if lengthy, than to face numerous 
expiration dates and the uncertainty of an atmosphère of continuai crisis 
(particularly since a single stoppage may shut down the entire industry 
anyway). 
The British Columbia expérience has pointed up the importance of 
voluntary employer activity in effectuating stable labour relations. CLRA 
has achieved a significant degree of direction and control over its members 
and reduced employer fragmentation during critical phases of collective 
bargaining. The development of coopération with owner-clients lias re-
moved a traditional strain on employer unity. Moreover, even under this 
conservative System of accréditation, there has been a noticeable narrowing 
in the imbalance of power between contractors and unions52. The success 
of CLRA has resulted in the formation of similar province-wide employer 
associations in Alberta, Ontario and New Brunswick. 
50
 Stability can be broadly defined as reducing the imbalance of power be-
tween contractors and labour unions (by promoting more effective employer organ-
izations) as reflected by the level of wage settlements and the likelihood of économie 
conflict. 
51 Annual wage increases alone averaged 17 percent in 1970 and 14 percent 
in 1971 throughout Canada. « Wage Increases in Construction Outstrip Output, » 
Globe and Mail, Toronto, September 6, 1972, p. 86. Statistics Canada has noted : 
«Since 1969 annual rate changes hâve been of the order of 10% or 
more for at least half of the city composite averages. This change to 
large annual increases is particularly conspciuous to the Ontario cities 
where in the last two years the smallest city increase was for 13.7% » 
Statistics Canada, «Construction Price Statistics,» Service Bulletin, Vol. 1. No. 4, 
p. 2. Statistics Canada will soon publish wage data including pay suppléments. 
52 To achieve parity in bargaining power some spokesmen in the management 
community hâve suggested the need to include non-association members in accré-
ditation. 
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CONCLUSION 
The preceding review of accréditation reveals that there are numerous 
législative approaches to the need for countervailing employer power in 
the construction industry. Thèse variations are found in : the criteria for 
determining the appropriate unit and requirements for majority support ; 
the légal effect of accréditation on collective agreements ; the process of 
de-accreditation ; and the restrictions on individual bargaining. To a 
certain extent thèse différences represent a response to the particular 
circumstances existing in each province. They also represent an experiment 
in the area of designing employer représentation schemes. 
To what extent, then, will accréditation stabilize labour-management 
relations in construction ? The answer to this question dépends on whether 
employers utilize this System and whether the présent légal framework 
can adequately promote greater employer unity. 
L'accréditation des associations d'employeurs 
dans l'industrie du bâtiment — 
Cinq façons de contre-balancer le pouvoir du patron 
Cet article recherche une double fin. Il s'agit d'abord de décrire les différentes 
mesures relatives à l'accréditation des associations d'employeurs qui ont été adop-
tées, ensuite d'évaluer les forces et les faiblesses des différentes tentatives qui ont 
été faites en vue d'atténuer l'effritement du bloc patronal et de redresser la balance 
du pouvoir. 
Le concept de l'accréditation a été introduit depuis quelques années dans la 
législation du travail de cinq provinces : l'Ontario, le Nouveau-Brunswick, la Nou-
velle-Ecosse, l'Alberta et la Colombie Britannique. Son adoption résulte de nom-
breuses études qui ont été faites sur les relations du travail dans l'industrie de la 
construction, études qui ont démontré la nécessité de « contre-balancer » la puis-
sance patronale à l'intérieur des cadres de la négociation collective dans cette in-
dustrie. Par essence, l'accréditation octroie le droit exclusif de négociation à une 
association d'employeurs pour un métier ou des métiers dans une branche déter-
minée de l'industrie dans une région déterminée. On allègue généralement que, 
grâce à l'accréditation, les associations seront en meilleure posture pour exercer 
une orientation et un contrôle sur leurs membres et atténuer l'effritement des forces, 
en particulier pendant les phases décisives des négociations. Les partisans de l'accré-
ditation estiment aussi qu'elle peut équilibrer le pouvoir de négociation et stabiliser 
les relations du travail dans l'industrie du bâtiment. 
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On peut qualifier les formes d'accréditation de « réalistes » ou de « conserva-
trices 2> selon la structure que revêt l'unité de négociation. Selon le mode réaliste, 
l'unité de négociation comprend tous les entrepreneurs syndicalisés par une asso-
ciation dans un métier ou une branche de métiers donnés dans une région. L'ap-
proche traditionnelle comprend les entrepreneurs membres d'une association d'em-
ployeurs existante qui entretient déjà des rapports collectifs de travail avec un syn-
dicat dans un métier ou une branche de métiers donnés dans une région. C'est le 
modèle réaliste qui s'applique dans toutes les provinces à l'exception de la Colom-
bie Britannique. 
LE MODÈLE RÉALISTE 
Bien qu'il y ait de nombreuses variantes dans ces formes d'accréditation, com-
me les critères fixés pour accréditer une association d'employeurs, deux distinctions 
majeures retiennent l'attention. En premier lieu, en Ontario, au Nouveau-Bruns-
wick et en Alberta, l'accréditation est rattachée aux droits de négociation existants. 
Étant donné que la négociation a lieu au niveau local avec un seul syndicat, il est 
inconcevable que l'accréditation altère beaucoup la structure des négociations. L'Al-
berta, toutefois, permet à une association d'employeurs de céder son droit de 
négociation à un autre groupement d'employeurs, et ceci favorise des régimes de 
négociation plus centralisés. Par ailleurs, la Nouvelle-Ecosse prévoit l'accrédi-
tation par « branche » de métiers plutôt que par « métier ». Ainsi, les associations 
d'employeurs sont davantage intéressés à la « branche » et à la région qu'elles dé-
sirent voir négocier qu'à entreprendre des rapports directs de négociation. En 
facilitant l'accréditation par branche de métiers, il est probable que le régime de 
la Nouvelle-Ecosse favorisera la négociation multi-métiers centralisée ce qui, 
mieux que dans les autres modèles « réalistes » d'accréditation, permettra de 
triompher du danger de perpétuer et de consolider l'état de fragmentation actuel. 
Une deuxième modification entre ces formules d'accréditation, c'est la mesure 
dans laquelle elle favorise l'unité chez les employeurs. La législation en cette 
matière accorde non seulement un statut de représentant exclusif à une association 
d'employeurs, mais elle défend aussi aux entrepreneurs pris individuellement de 
négocier et elle interdit tout accord ou toute entente en vue de fournir des em-
ployés durant une grève ou un lock-out légaux. Cependant, l'unité des employeurs 
se trouve menacée par une disposition dite clause de sauvegarde en Ontario et au 
Nouveau-Brunswick et par la limitation à soixante jours de l'interdiction de la né-
gociation individuelle en Alberta. La clause de sauvegarde stipule que rien dans la 
loi n'interdit à un employeur de continuer le travail pendant une grève. En Alberta, 
si une grève dure plus de 60 jours, l'entrepreneur est libre de négocier individuelle-
ment. Ces deux restrictions, surtout la clause de sauvegarde, permettraient aux 
employeurs d'abandonner leurs associations et, par ricochet, rendre illusoire l'accré-
ditation. En Nouvelle-Ecosse, où la négociation individuelle est interdite à moins 
que l'ordonnance d'accréditation soit expirée, on ne trouve aucune disposition de 
cette nature. 
Un autre problème qui se pose aux associations d'employeurs, c'est celui des 
entrepreneurs nationaux ou multinationaux. Dans le passé, ces entrepreneurs si-
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gnaient des conventions collectives exportables (free-ride agreements) en échange 
de la paix industrielle ainsi que dans l'intention de nuire au pouvoir de négociation 
des entrepreneurs locaux. Ce n'est qu'en Alberta où les associations d'employeurs 
ont l'autorité de négocier au nom des entrepreneurs nationaux et multinationaux 
qui ont à leur service des employés dans la région et dans le champ d'application 
du métier. 
LE MODÈLE « CONSERVATEUR » 
Contrairement aux autres provinces, une association d'employeurs accréditée 
est en Colombie Britannique l'agent de négociation exclusif pour les membres de 
l'association qui « acquiescent » à l'appliquer. La loi ne semble pas favoriser beau-
coup l'union des employeurs, étant donné qu'elle permet à un employeur de se 
retirer de l'unité de négociation dans les quatre ou cinq mois qui suivent la mise 
en vigueur d'une convention collective négociée par l'association d'employeurs. Dans 
la pratique courante, cela n'a toutefois pas posé de problème à cause des critères 
stricts qui ont été imposés pour s'en retirer, soit un changement dans la nature 
des affaires. La plus grande menace à l'unité des employeurs provient de l'inap-
titude des associations d'employeurs accrédités à exercer un contrôle sur les non-
membres. 
APPRÉCIATION PRÉLIMINAIRE 
La nouveauté de la législation en matière d'accréditation ne permet guère 
encore d'en mesurer les effets sur l'industrie du bâtiment. Cependant, une appré-
ciation préliminaire permet de voir que l'accréditation a raffermi l'union des em-
ployeurs quoique son influence sur l'équilibre dans les négociations et sur la stabi-
lisation des relations du travail soit moins certaine. En Colombie Britannique, où 
l'expérience est plus avancée, la Construction Labour Relations Association (CLRA) 
en est arrivée à un degré marqué d'influence et de contrôle sur ses membres. En 
outre, elle a obtenu la coopération du Conseil des Employeurs pour s'assurer que 
les clients de l'industrie ne feront pas pression sur les entrepreneurs pour rompre 
les rangs. Toutefois, on a exprimé de l'inquiétude au sujet des faiblesses du cadre 
législatif existant pour favoriser l'union des employeurs en particulier à cause de 
la clause de sauvegarde et de l'exclusion des non-membres de l'accréditation. 
L'accréditation a eu peu d'effet sur la structure des négociations à cause de 
la confiance que l'on portait au droit de négociation tel qu'il existait. Trois points 
à surveiller toutefois : 1. Le projet albertain de transfert des droits d'accréditation ; 
2. La demande formulée par les syndicats d'entreprendre des négociations multi-
métiers avec la CLRA en 1972 ; 3. L'approche de la négociation par branche de 
métiers en Nouvelle-Ecosse. Il faudra attendre les expériences de négociation 
sous ce nouveau régime avant d'être en mesure de voir si l'accréditation a stabilisé 
la négociation collective dans l'industrie de la construction. En Colombie Britanni-
que, CLRA a réussi à réduire le taux d'inflation par les salaires, mais ce fut au 
prix de deux grèves prolongées. 
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CONCLUSION 
L'analyse de la législation en matière d'accréditation indique que l'on a consi-
déré sous de nombreux angles la nécessité de contre-balancer le pouvoir individuel 
de l'employeur dans l'industrie de la construction. Dans une certaine mesure, ces 
différences traduisent les conditions particulières qui existent dans chaque province. 
Elles constituent aussi une expérience dans ce secteur en vue de mettre au point 
des formules de représentation pour les employeurs. Même s'il est trop tôt pour 
se demander si l'accréditation a stabilisé les relations du travail dans l'industrie de 
la construction, la réponse éventuelle repose sur l'utilisation que feront les em-
ployeurs du nouveau système et de la valeur du cadre juridique mis en place pour 
favoriser convenablement une plus grande union parmi les employeurs. 
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